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that significantly compromises the appropriative rights of present or
future water users." Based on the legislative intent and the statute
itself the court concluded that, under Colorado law, water quality
standards only apply to discharges of pollutants and not to
appropriations of water. Colorado Wild's claim, which was based solely
on the allegation that withdrawals of water from the North Fork would
increase the pollutants in the Snake River, failed to show any violation
of Colorado state water quality standards, and therefore failed.
Next, Colorado Wild argued the Forest Service violated NFMA by
failing to comply with the CWA. The court rejected this argument and
observed the distinct roles the federal government and state
governments have under the CWA. Under the CWA, the EPA
monitored point source discharges of pollutants into navigable waters
while states were responsible for implementing water quality standards
for intrastate waters. The court found that the appropriation of water
was not a discharge of pollution within the meaning of the CWA, and
thus rejected Colorado Wild's claim that the Forest Service violated
NFMA by failing to comply with the CWA.
In its second cause of action, Colorado Wild argued the Forest
Service violated section 313 of the CWA.
The Forest Service
challenged this claim, contending the United States' sovereign
immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
In
response, Colorado Wild asserted section 313 of the CWA waived the
United States' sovereign immunity. The court examined the text of
section 313 and recognized a federal agency waived sovereign
immunity only when one of its facilities or activities resulted in the
discharge of pollutants. However, the court held section 313 did not
waive sovereign immunity where, as here, the federal agency was not
itself the polluter in violation of the CWA. Since the United States was
immune from suit, the court was without subject matter jurisdiction.
The court held Colorado water quality standards only apply to
discharges of pollutants and not to appropriations of water. Thus, the
court dismissed Colorado Wild's cause of action alleging violations of
NFMA for failure to state a claim. The court further held the Forest
Service was immune from suit, since it was not the actual polluter in
violation of the CWA.
Lucia Padilla
Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D.
Colo. 2002) (holding judicial resolution of a claim that a mining
company violated the Clean Water Act would not interfere with the
company's discharge permit application pending before a state
administrative agency).
El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. ("El Paso") operated a gold mine in
Teller County, Colorado. Sierra Club brought suit against El Paso in

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging
the company violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging
pollutants into navigable waters without a permit. Sierra Club filed a
partial motion for summary judgment based on its compliance with
the statutory prerequisites for initiating a citizen suit under the CWA.
El Paso, in response, filed both a motion to dismiss or to stay and a
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The former motion
challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and the Buford abstention. The latter motion
claimed Sierra Club failed to meet the statutory prerequisites to sue.
El Paso also filed a second motion for partial summary judgment
alleging it was neither the owner nor operator of the mine shaft
discharging the pollution. The court granted Sierra Club's motion for
partial summary judgment and denied all of El Paso's motions.
El Paso's mine was located in the Cripple Creek watershed and
Mining District. Cripple Creek was a tributary of Fourmile Creek that
was tributary to the Arkansas River. The Mining District contained a
series of underground drainage tunnels. One of those tunnels, the
Roosevelt Tunnel, lay directly underneath El Paso's mine and
discharged into Cripple Creek. El Paso, at the time of the suit, did not
have a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit to discharge pollutants into, or from, Roosevelt Tunnel into
Cripple Creek. As a result, Sierra Club brought suit against El Paso,
claiming the mining company violated the CWA by discharging zinc
and manganese into the Roosevelt Tunnel and Cripple Creek without
a permit.
El Paso's motion to deny or to stay the case alleged the court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction, under the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and the Buford abstention, because the company had a
discharge permit application pending before the Colorado Water
Quality Control Division ("CWQCD").
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court can stay an
ongoing judicial proceeding so that an administrative agency, rather
than the court, may resolve issues that fall within the special
competency of that agency. In analyzing El Paso's claim that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction precluded subject matter jurisdiction,
the court distinguished the facts of this case from two federal cases
where the courts declined jurisdiction.
In both cases, an
administrative agency issued either an order or a permit while the
citizen suit was pending. In the first case, the court declined
jurisdiction because the court might have subjected the defendants to
conflicting orders. In the second case, the court declined jurisdiction
because the agency's resolution of technical issues might preclude the
need for federal action.
In this case, the court did not decide an issue within the special
competency of the CWQCD; the court only decided whether El Paso
discharged pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. The
court found that resolution of Sierra Club's claim would neither
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require the resolution of technical issues within the special
competency of the CWQCD nor interfere with the orders of the
CWQCD. As a result, the court found the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction inapplicable.
Under the Buford abstention, a federal court must decline to
interfere with administrative proceedings if state court review is
available and: (1) the court must decide difficult and especially
important questions of state law whose resolution transcends the case
then at bar; or (2) the court's review would disrupt state efforts to
establish a coherent public policy. El Paso argued a court decision
regarding the permitting of mining tunnel discharges could create a
conflict in statutory interpretation, interfere with CWQCD
proceedings, and undermine the State of Colorado's attempt to
establish a policy for the regulation of mining tunnel discharges. The
court rejected El Paso's argument and denied the company's motion
to dismiss or stay because there was no evidence in the record about
action CWQCD took on the permit, nor state or federal orders
regarding the discharges.
The court next decided the parties' cross-motions for partial
summary judgment regarding the statutory prerequisites to initiating a
CWA citizen suit. Sierra Club asked the court to affirm its compliance
with the jurisdictional prerequisites. El Paso alleged Sierra Club failed
to identify the pollutants discharged, the point source, or how El Paso
added pollutants to the Roosevelt Tunnel.
The court's analysis addressed two issues. First, El Paso claimed
Sierra Club's notice was not specific enough in its description of the
pollutants, their sources, and how the discharges increased pollution
in the Roosevelt tunnel. The court, citing Public Interest Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., dismissed El Paso's claim holding that Sierra
Club's failure to identify specific pollutants did not deprive the court
of jurisdiction. The court found Sierra Club's notice adequate
because the organization told El Paso what the point sources were and
explained how pollution from those sources migrated into navigable
waters. Second, the court addressed El Paso's understanding of Sierra
Club's notice, by analyzing El Paso's actions after Sierra Club gave
notice. Relying on two federal decisions which held that notice was
adequate when an alleged violator took specific remedial action in
response to notice of the alleged violation, the court found that El
Paso's formation of a limited liability corporation and application for
an NPDES permit constituted sufficient understanding of the
allegations and remedial action sufficient to deem the notice
adequate. As a result, the court denied El Paso's motion and granted
Sierra Club's.
El Paso's second motion for partial summary judgment claimed the
company was neither the owner nor operator of the mine shaft
because the company sold the property to a third party two months
prior to receiving notice from Sierra Club. In response, Sierra Club
alleged El Paso retained an easement over and through the property.
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The organization's response cited El Paso's application to CWQCD,
which stated that the company's property included a mineshaft
connecting to the Roosevelt Tunnel. As a result, the court found there
remained a genuine issue of material fact regarding El Paso's
ownership interest in the mineshaft and denied El Paso's motion.
Merc Pittinos

United States v. Lamplight Equestrian, No. 00 C 6486, 2002 U.S. Dist.
L XIS 3694 (N.D. II. Mar. 8, 2002) (holding that the Army Corps of
Engineers has the authority to regulate wetlands with an intermittent
connection to interstate or navigable waterways).
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") filed suit in
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against
Lamplight Equestrian ("Lamplight") for using fill material to build a
road in a wetland area without a permit. Lamplight claimed the Corps
lacked authority to regulate the area due to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC'), which reduced the scope of
the Corps' authority. Lamplight also claimed that an earlier permit
entitled it to build the road. Each party filed a motion for summary
judgment. The court granted the Corps' motion for summary
judgment against Lamplight.
The disputed wetland was located on Lamplight's property north
of the headwaters of Brewster Creek. The creek connected to the Fox
River, which flowed into other interstate waterways. In considering the
motions for summary judgment, the district court decided that the
only relevant issue pertained to the jurisdiction of the Corps.
The Corps argued that despite the Supreme Court's ruling in
SWANCC, the Corps' authority to regulate the wetland remained
intact. Six lower court decisions holding that SWANCC only narrowly
reduced the Corps' power substantiated this argument. The Corps
claimed that administrative regulations included wetlands within the
scope of the Corps' authority, so long as they could affect interstate
commerce. To affect interstate commerce, a wetland or like area must
lie adjacent to a navigable waterway. In this case, an unbroken line of
water connected the wetland area and Brewster Creek, a tributary of
the Fox River, which in turn fed other waterways, crossing state
boundaries. Thus, the Corps possessed the necessary authority to
regulate the wetland.
The district court agreed with the Corps. Its analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC followed other narrow readings
in the reduction of the Corps' authority. Significantly, the district
court decided that the crucial distinction between this case and the
SWANCC case was the degree of isolation of the regulated area. In
SWANCC, the waters in question lacked a direct connection to a

